COVID-19 as a stress test: Assessing the bank regulatory framework

The broad economic damage of the COVID-19 pandemic poses the first major test of the bank regulatory reforms put in place after the Global Financial Crisis. Our study assesses the U.S. regulatory framework, with an emphasis on capital and liquidity requirements. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, banks were well capitalized and held ample liquid assets, which partly reflects enhanced requirements. The overall robust capital and liquidity levels resulted in a resilient banking system, which maintained lending and market making through the early stages of the pandemic. Trading activity was a source of strength for banks, reflecting in part a prudent regulatory approach. That said, leverage requirements are associated with more repo position netting by banks, with potential implications for market making.

Bank resilience over the COVID-19 crisis: The role of regulatory capital

Using COVID-19 as an exogenous shock to the banking system, we implement the Difference-in-Differences method to empirically evaluate the role of the regulatory capital in strengthening the resiliency of bank lending activities during the crisis period. Our results suggest that banks with a higher level of regulatory capital ratio prior to the COVID-19 shock lend more resiliently to the real economy during the crisis than those with lower regulatory capital ratios ex-ante. It implies that the recent reforms on bank regulatory capital have effectively built up bank strength which in turn helped banks continue lending to the real economy during the COVID-19 crisis.

How do banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking respond to COVID-19? Empirical insights of ownership structure

Purpose>This study aims to investigate the relationship between capital regulation and risk-taking behavior (financial stability) concerning the impacts of the recent global (COVID-19) crisis and diverse ownership structure.Design/methodology/approach>The analysis uses an unbalanced panel data set from 32 commercial banks of Bangladesh for 2000–2020. The authors use the two-step system generalized method of moments and three-stage least squares to produce the study outcomes.Findings>The robust results reveal that the relationship between capital regulation and risk (financial stability) is negative (positive) and bi-directional. More significantly, COVID-19 makes banks fragile and demands more capital to absorb risk. However, the effect of COVID-19 is heterogeneous when the authors consider ownership structure. Among the diverse ownership styles, Islamic and active shareholding show their controlling wheel on capital regulation and risk-taking aptitude (financial stability) during the global (COVID-19) crisis. In normal economic conditions, private banks and minority active shareholding can be a good determinant for capital regulation and risk (financial stability). On the other hand, state-owned and large banks have been found as less capitalized and highly risky.Originality/value>This study is the pioneer in exploring capital regulation and risk toward the recent global (COVID-19) crisis.

Capped borrower credit risk and insurer hedging during the COVID-19 outbreak.

In this paper, we apply the risk-neutral valuation methodology to evaluate a life insurer's equity. We model the features capped by the explicit treatment of the borrowing firm's credit risk, the optimal guaranteed rate-setting, and the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak. The results show that the severe effect of the COVID-19 epidemic on the borrowing firm harms its insurance business but that stringent capital regulation helps. The severe impact of COVID-19 on both the borrowing firm and the insurer hedging harm policyholder protection, thereby adversely affecting insurance stability.

COVID-19, insurer board utility, and capital regulation.

This paper develops a down-and-out call option model by introducing a structural break in volatility to capture the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak. The life insurer's equity and its board's utility are evaluated at the optimal guaranteed rate in the equity maximization. Results suggest that the seriousness degree of the COVID-19 outbreak and capital regulation enhance the optimal guaranteed rate and the board's utility. Increased the board's utility by increasing liabilities costs insurer profitability. Conflicts of incentives can arise during the COVID-19 outbreak.